Equinor’s biggest offshore wind power investment is in the UK – the largest market for this energy source in the world. The commitment covers both fixed and floating turbines. The British government’s target, set with the industry, is to meet 30 per cent of electricity consumption from offshore by 2030. This market is therefore growing.
By Kristin Øye Gjerde, Norwegian Petroleum Museum. Updated by Ole Jone Eide 9 Nov. 2026.
- Crew transfer vessel at an offshore substation. Source: Sheringham Shoal
More wind is available at sea than on land, making it appropriate to base energy generation offshore. While a fixed turbine stands on the seabed, the floating type is attached with mooring lines.
Wind power is a renewable source where the kinetic energy in moving air rotates turbines to generate electricity. Modern wind turbines generate lift on their curved rotor blades, like an aircraft wing, to provide the energy for rotating the turbine. This rotary movement is then converted to electricity by a generator inside the nacelle (or housing) on the turbine support shaft. Exploiting the lift allows modern wind turbines to utilise more than half the available wind energy, giving an efficiency of about 50 per cent – very good compared with other types of renewable energy.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.uib.no/sites/w3.uib.no/files/attachments/havvind_enkelt_forklart.pdf.
Conditions on the relatively shallow UK continental shelf (UKCS) are very suitable for fixed wind turbines, and it was this technology which first brought oil companies from Norway into the market.
Fixed wind power – Sheringham Shoal and Dudgeon
Statoil’s major commitment to clean energy in the UK began with the wind power projects acquired when it merged with the oil and energy division of Norway’s Norsk Hydro group in 2007.
Hydro was the first Norwegian oil company to gain a foothold in the British market for renewables, after securing 50 per cent of Scira Offshore Energy Ltd on 28 June 2005. This UK joint venture was licensed to build the Sheringham Shoal wind farm off the Norfolk coast of England. The plans were based on existing technology – in other words, fixed turbines to generate electricity.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/representantforslag/2014-2015/dok8-201415-118.pdf.
Since energy production would take place offshore, this activity was regarded after the merger as a natural business for an oil company operating offshore. At a time when questions were being asked about the petroleum industry’s greenhouse gas emissions, it offered a specific result for the company’s renewables strategy.
In 2008, Scira and StatoilHydro – as the company was called until it reverted to Statoil in 2009 – secured project approval from the British government. Responsibility for development and operation of the wind farm rested with Scira. This represented StatoilHydro’s first major renewables commitment.
At that point, the company was established in the UK market as a gas supplier from the Troll and Ormen Lange fields via the Langeled pipeline. That was far more profitable than wind power. But earnings were only one of the short-term considerations with the Sheringham Shoal commitment. Another was to secure experience with renewable energy.
In order to spread the financial risk, Statoil sold half its shares in the wind farm to Norwegian state-owned electricity generator Statkraft. The latter thereby became involved in the offshore wind power market, but withdrew later to leave Equinor as operator in 2022.
Wind Farm Place marine coordination centre. Photo: Campbell MacCallum
Development did not progress without a hitch. The wind farm covers 35 square kilometres, with water depths ranging from 17 to 22 metres. Difficulties with installing the foundations led to expensive delays, but the shafts for all 88 turbines were in place by September 2011. Installing the actual turbines took rather longer, and was not completed until the following summer.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.seajacks.com/news/turbine-installation-complete-sheringham-shoal/. The farm is connected to land by two cables.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheringham_Shoal_Offshore_Wind_Farm Its official inauguration was conducted by Crown Prince Haakon of Norway on 27 June 2012.
On the basis of their experience in developing Sheringham Shoal, Statoil and Statkraft also acquired the neighbouring licence, Dudgeon, in 2012. Dudgeon commenced commercial operations in 2017.
The links between Sheringham Shoal and Dudgeon have become increasingly close over time. This became particularly evident when the UK authorities granted development consent for both areas through a single approval process in 2024.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sheringham-and-dudgeon-extension-projects-development-consent-decision-announced By joining forces to operate both wind farms, the partners, including Equinor, were able to utilise capacity even more efficiently.
Renewable sources accounted for 33 per cent of UK electricity supply in 2018, with offshore wind power providing 6.6 per cent. At that time, Hywind Scotland – another bold new project run by Statoil – had become operational.[REMOVE]Fotnote:TU, 8 March 2019, https://www.tu.no/artikler/storbritannia-sikter-mot-30-prosent-offshore-vind/459835.
Floating wind power – Hywind Scotland
Learning lessons and continued development were among the main goals for Statoil’s Hywind Scotland floating wind power project in 2015. It lies 29 kilometres east of Peterhead, in water depths of 95-120 metres.
Statoil wanted to apply its expertise with offshore energy production to innovation and to building the world’s first floating wind power farm. It secured a licence for the project on condition that costs were to be reduced by 60-70 per cent from the Hywind Demo research project off Norway.
The development was bold both technologically and financially. Statoil was initially the sole owner of Hywind Scotland but, in order to reduce the financial risk, sold a 25 per cent stake to the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar) in 2017.
Mark Boon and Matthew Bramwell aboard the crew transfer vessel MCS Swath 1, on their way out to work at Hywind Scotland. Photo: Ole Jørgen Bratland
Work on constructing the installations began in 2016. Turbine supports for the farm were built in Spain, while all the components were assembled at Stord in western Norway. The floating structures comprise a steel cylinder ballasted with water and rock, which extends 78 metres beneath the sea surface and is attached to seabed with three mooring lines.[REMOVE]Fotnote:UK wind – equinor.com. The floating farm became operational in October 2017.
Despite the emphasis given to cost reductions, the offshore installations were three times more expensive than fixed wind turbines.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hywind_Scotland. The potential of the technology was nevertheless so great that Statoil wanted to go further with it. Floating turbines gave the company an opportunity to exploit its existing offshore oil and gas expertise and to build on this. Everything beneath the waves on a wind turbine was the same as a moored oil and gas floater, and everything above represented renewable energy solutions. “It’s a perfect marriage between these two technologies,” Stephen Bull, Equinor’s former head of wind power, declared enthusiastically.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.aftenbladet.no/aenergi/i/0LOW2/statoil-naermere-en-hywind-utbygging.
The work has had spin-offs in Norway. In December 2017, the government announced a licensing round covering one-two areas in Norwegian waters for floating wind power in the form of a full-scale pilot farm. This is receiving support from Enova, a state-owned company which makes annual grants from a climate and energy fund. Its aim is to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions as a contribution to meeting Norway’s climate commitments for 2030, advancing innovation in energy and climate technology, and encouraging efficient power and energy consumption.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Enova was established in 2001 and was owned by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy on behalf of the state until the first half of 2018, when it was transferred to the Ministry of Climate and the Environment. Source: Wikipedia.
One objective is to make floating wind turbines a profitable industry for Norway. Developing the technology and industrialising floater concepts would make it possible to exploit wind power in a number of ocean areas – not just shallow seas.[REMOVE]Fotnote:Dagbladet, 13 December 2017, “Flytende havvindkraft”. Almost 80 per cent of the global potential for offshore wind power lies in waters deeper than 60 metres.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.equinor.com/energy/offshore-wind
According to analyses in 2019 from the International Energy Agency (IEA), offshore wind power is set to expand substantially over the next two decades. As it becomes a growing part of electricity supply, it will help to decarbonise energy systems and reduce air pollution.[REMOVE]Fotnote:Offshore wind to become a $1 trillion industry – News – IEA.
Large-scale fixed wind power – Dogger Bank
Equinor’s next project in the UK is the Dogger Bank. The British government announced on 20 September 2019 that Equinor and SSE Renewables had been awarded contracts to develop three large wind farm projects in this part of the North Sea. The company Vårgrønn has also acquired an ownership interest in the project.
The first turbine began supplying electricity to the UK grid in October 2023. The full development is expected to be completed in 2027. Known historically as a rich fishing ground, the Dogger Bank will then be home to the world’s largest offshore wind farm area to date. Located 130 kilometres east of Yorkshire, it covers 1 700 square kilometres – larger than Greater London – with water depths of 20-35 metres. The large offshore wind project is expected to have an operational lifetime of up to 35 years and will be operated by Equinor. The projects are expected to generate enough electricity to supply approximately six million UK homes. [REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.equinor.com/no/nyheter/202310-dogger-bank-produserer
Dogger Bank – one of Equinor’s biggest offshore wind projects. Illustration: Equinor
Technology for fixed offshore wind power has progressed since the initial projects. Turbines and rotor blades have increased in size and outputs are larger. When the first 13-megawatt turbines from General Electric start rotating in 2013, one sweep of their 220-metre rotors will generate enough electricity to operate an average UK home for two days, Equinor has said.
Because of the long distance from land, the project will be the first off Britain to use high-voltage direct current cables to transmit the electricity to land. Too much of the output would be lost if alternating current cables were used.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Submarine_power_cable
The contracts awarded provide for a fixed price over the first 15 years in operation, which gives the projects a long and predictable income profile. “With very good wind conditions, shallow water and opportunities to make economies of scale, these projects are well positioned to deliver renewable energy at a low cost to British homes and companies,” Equinor CEO Eldar Sætre said in 2019.
Future in wind power
Equinor’s offshore wind power ambitions are not confined to the UK. The company has established itself in this field both off the north-western USA and in the Baltic. According to its management, the goal is to be a major global player in offshore wind power, and to increase its renewable capacity 30-fold from the 2019 level. Wind power at sea could be one of the world’s leading technologies for electricity generation. The projects in the UK have thereby been of great importance for Equinor’s future as an energy company.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.equinor.com/energy/offshore-wind
Nigeria was Africa’s largest oil producer and one of the world’s biggest exporters of this commodity, with Angola close on its heels. These two big west-coast petroleum nations were designated as the second big priority area for the Statoil-BP alliance. But war, corruption, intricate licensing systems and domestic opposition did what they could to undermine the commitment.
By Trude Meland, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
- One of Nigeria’s many gas metering stations. Photo: Bjørn Rasen
When their partnership began in 1991, the two companies became involved in the Democratic republic of the Congo as well as Angola and Nigeria, but withdrew from the first of these areas in the same year. A venture in Equatorial Guinea, operated from Nigeria, was also short-lived.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, Helge. (2009). Til siste dråpe. Oslo: Aschehoug: 238.
Through various engagements, BP was already established in all three west African states when the alliance with Statoil began. However, the military regime in Nigeria had taken over the British oil major’s operations in the country during 1979 as part of a massive nationalisation wave. During the 1990s, the Nigerian mood shifted from nationalisation to internationalisation, and a more open attitude was adopted towards foreign companies. That change in climate created an opening for BP to return to the giant of Africa, this time accompanied by Statoil.
Repressive regimes, executions and environmental disasters
Map of Nigeria. Source: Equinor
Statoil was to be responsible for the alliance’s joint operations in Nigeria, making this country its baptism of fire as an international oil company. A significant proportion of the staff intended to support these activities were located in Stavanger. But a number of BP personnel were included in this Norway-based Nigeria management from the start.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, Helge. (2009). Til siste dråpe. Oslo: Aschehoug: 231
Operational responsibility for the west African commitment was allocated to BP and its London head office. Only a minimal share of alliance personnel were permanently stationed in Africa. While 23 people, all BP employees, worked with Angola from London, only one was based full-time in Luanda. Thirty staff handled Nigeria in Stavanger, with a single person in the African country itself.
Nigeria remained an important priority area until the mid-1990s, and activity there expanded. The alliance succeeded with its strategy and established itself as a leading player in the deepwater areas off the Nigerian coast. That position was completely overturned in 1995, when political conditions in Nigeria deteriorated dramatically.
Ever greater dissatisfaction had spread among many of the people living around the Niger delta. They received little or no share of the big revenues generated by the oil resources in their region. In addition, a massive environmental disaster began to manifest itself in the delta area.
A coup in 1993 had introduced one of the most brutal and corrupt regimes in Nigeria’s history. The repressive government banned all political activity and opponents were jailed. That in turn unleashed extensive protests across much of the country. These increased from 1995 after the military regime executed nine activists from the oil-rich delta – including author and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa.
These executions helped to create pressure from international public opinion. Foreign companies faced demands to pull out of Nigeria. The worst-affected was Shell, which had been producing oil for many years from a controversial part of the Nigeria delta. But organised campaigns were also conducted against Statoil in Norway. The company responded that it did not want to become involved in political processes and chose to accept the political burden of remaining in Nigeria. It argued that the human rights position would not improve if it and BP withdrew.
John Browne from BP, Nigerian politician Jibril Aminu and Statoil’s Harald Norvik in Nigeria. Photo: Leif Berge
These developments were not particularly concerning for the alliance to begin with. It concentrated on offshore exploration, and was not involved with oil spills and dead fish in the delta. And, in the middle of the unrest on land, the alliance could raise a mighty cheer when oil was proven with its first wildcat – which also represented the first deepwater discovery off Nigeria. But the jubilation was short-lived, since the resources proved non-commercial. At the same time, the political conditions caught up with the partners.
Statoil had the most to lose by pulling out. Nigeria was where the company intended to demonstrate that it could serve as an operator, even under difficult conditions, outside the North Sea.
It now transpired that repressive regimes, executions and environmental disasters were not the only problems facing BP and Statoil. The financial difficulties were a more difficult challenge. Nor had the alliance succeeded in securing its own operatorships. And its interests in other fields had also failed to yield sufficient oil to justify the exploration costs. The accounts were looking critical.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ryggvik, Helge. (2009). Til siste dråpe. Oslo: Aschehoug: 233.
The Agbami oilfield project is one of Nigeria’s largest deepwater developments. Photo: unknown/Offshore Technologies
No big breakthrough occurred on the exploration side. On 20 April 1998, Statoil and BP signed a contract with Nigerian company Allied Energy on the sale of the alliance’s 40 per cent interest in block 210 – the Oyo oil field. It afterwards transpired that neither Statoil nor BP received the sale price. In addition came a price reduction of about 30 per cent, which many have characterised as incomprehensible.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Keilen, Erlend. (2003. 3. november). E24. Statoil fikk aldri betalt for oljefelt i Nigeria
An investigation was conducted, and its report concluded in 2004 that: the fact that the statements obtained are ambiguous, combined with the fact that no written documentation exists about the decisions which must have been taken, provides some scope for speculation. On that basis, the investigation committee would recommend to Statoil that it conducts an internal inquiry to clarify the circumstances. The following day, Statoil declared itself not guilty of corruption at a press conference in Oslo.[REMOVE]Fotnote: E24. (2010. 1. mars). NTB. Hemmelig Statoil-gransking av priskutt i Nigeria.
Although the alliance itself withdrew from Nigeria, Statoil remained on an independent basis and had interests in 2020 in Agbami – the country’s largest deepwater field.
Chevron is the operator of the field with a 67.30 percent ownership interest and Prime 127 has the remaining 12.49 percent. Equinor also operates two exploration licenses – OML 128 and 129 – with a share of 53.85 per cent in both. Six wells have been drilled in both, with two discoveries made. None of the fields are planned developed.
On Equinor’s own website, the company describes that its success in Nigeria “is underpinned by our sustainability work, ensuring we are a responsible operator and are proactive in improving opportunities for the communities where we work.”[REMOVE]Fotnote: https://www.equinor.com/where-we-are/nigeria
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is often presented as a means of combating climate change – and has already been under way on Norway’s Sleipner gas field since 1996.
By Björn Lindberg, Norwegian Petroleum Museum
- Illustration of carbon capture and storage (CCS) at Sleipner. Illustration: Equinor.
Sleipner West was discovered as early as 1974 with Esso as the operator and declared commercial in 1984. After a plan for development and operation (PDO) was submitted to the government in 1992, it came on stream in 1996. But something had to be done about the high CO2 content in the field’s output in order to meet the specifications in the gas sales contract.
While natural gas primarily comprises methane (CH4), it also contains varying amounts of undesirable substances such as hydrogen sulphide (H2S), nitrogen and carbon dioxide (CO2). Many fire extinguishers contain pure CO2 because it displaces the oxygen needed to sustain combustion. This is also why a high CO2 content is undesirable in natural gas for use with ovens and the like – it will not burn so well. As a result, gas sales contracts will often specify a maximum quantity of undesirable substances permitted on delivery in order to ensure combustion quality.
Scrubbed clean and stored
CO2 pipeline on Sleipner A. Photo: Øyvind Hagen/Equinor
The gas in Sleipner West comes from 3 450 metres beneath the seabed and contains about nine per cent CO2. That exceeds the ceiling specified in the Troll gas sales agreements, which is 2.5 per cent for this component. As a result, the excess CO2 must be removed before exporting the gas. This is done in two ways – by blending the Sleipner West gas with gas from Sleipner East and other fields with low CO2 content. To further reduce the CO2 content in the exported Sleipner West gas, CO2 is removed from it. This is done by adding amines – organic bases containing a nitrogen atom which bind to the CO2 – on the separate Sleipner T gas treatment platform tied back to the concrete Sleipner A installation.
After being removed from the gas flow, the CO2-rich amines are heated to separate the mix into its component parts again – a process called scrubbing. That allows the amine to be reused and leaves the CO2 to be disposed of. This technology was not off-the-shelf, and had some problems and was costly. Countless modifications had to be made. One favorable factor for Statoil as operator was that the technology used was from the French company Total. Total was also a partner in the license, and hence did not cause much commotion when there was trouble with the technology. [REMOVE]Fotnote: Kyrre Nese in e-mail 8. august 2022.
CO2 is re-injected
Since the latter has no commercial value, the simplest – and cheapest – way of dealing with this gas would be to release it to the air. That might have been done on Sleipner West, too, but the introduction of a Norwegian carbon tax for petroleum operations on the NCS meant it would be very expensive. So operator Statoil opted for a different approach, which involved pumping the CO2 back underground. Since returning the gas to the reservoir of origin would simply increase its content in future production, the geologists had to find somewhere else to put it.
A number of conditions must be in place for CO2 to be stored in the sub-surface. The relevant formation must have sufficiently porous and permeable rocks, be saturated with saline water, be deep enough (more than 800 metres below sea level) to ensure that the CO2 has the desired properties, have an impermeable cap rock to prevent the gas leaking out, and cover a sufficiently large area with a big enough volume.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://bellona.org/assets/sites/3/Case_Study_on_the_Sleipner_Gas_Field_in_Norway.pdf
The Utsira formation, which overlaps the Sleipner reservoirs at a different depth, meets these criteria and represents an ideal location for disposing of CO2. It lies about 800 metres beneath the seabed, while the main Sleipner East reservoir is roughly 1 700 metres further down.
Using a single well drilled from the concrete Sleipner A platform, an annual injection rate of about a million tonnes means some 20 million tonnes of CO2 have been deposited in the Utsira formation since 1996.
Regular investigations of the sub-surface have been conducted using seismic surveying to ensure that no CO2 is leaking from the structure to the seabed. These studies show that the injected gas is occupying an ever-expanding area of the formation and that no threat of leaks exists.
CO2 injection from Sleipner West was a pioneering project on the NCS and has been a success. Since 2019, CO2 from Utgard – which comprises no less than 16 per cent of this field’s output – has also been separated out on Sleipner T and injected into the Utsira formation.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Annual report Utgard 2019, AU-UTG-00002, Equinor.
The Snøhvit gas produced in Norway’s Barents Sea sector contains five-eight per cent CO2. This is separated out in the same way as on Sleipner, but at the Melkøya processing plant on land rather than on an offshore platform. Separated CO2 is piped back to the field in a compressed liquid phase and injected into the subsurface. Although injection problems have arisen, studies indicate that no gas is leaking out. A similar CCS process was pursued on the Salah gas field in Algeria, but terminated in 2011 because of capacity limitations in the geological structures.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://uit.no/om/enhet/aktuelt/nyhet?p_document_id=552337&p_dimension_id=88137 and https://www.equinor.com/energy/carbon-capture-utilisation-and-storage
CCS on Sleipner has been under way longer than any comparable project, and the data and experience this has yielded will be important for future schemes of this kind. In 2019, Equinor and its partners in the field released information on CO2 injection and monitoring as a contribution to innovation for and development of storing greenhouse gases.[REMOVE]Fotnote:https://www.equinor.com/news/archive/2019-06-12-sleipner-co2-storage-data
Many groups, both Norwegian and foreign, visited Statoil in the 1970s. The company welcomed 700 guests in the first half of 1977 alone. But some meetings yielded unintended culture clashes.
By Håkon Lavik, retired Statoil
- Chinese visit at Statoil. Photo: Leif Berge/Equinor
Frugal style
The head of the American Petroleum Institute (API) – which represents the whole US oil and gas sector – visited Statoil in 1975. CEO Arve Johnsen was host to this highly influential executive, and provided a briefing on Statoil’s business. That included explaining how it was becoming an interesting oil seller. One point raised by the API president was whether Norway had ambitions to join the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries – Opec. Johnsen could affirm that it did not.
Following their meeting, the pair strolled over the road to the KNA Hotel in Stavanger for lunch. Johnsen asked his guest whether he would like something to drink with his food. The American smiled broadly, and perhaps expected a glass of wine. His surprise can be imagined when the frugal Norwegian went on: “How about a glass of milk?” Without any change of expression, the API man expressed his thanks and drank milk in good Norwegian style together with Johnsen.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Related by Håkon Lavik, former information office at Statoil, 2 July 2020.
Formal versus informal
International banks were queuing up in 1976-77 to lend Statoil money for its share of the Statfjord development. A Japanese bank delegation announced it was arriving in Stavanger on a Sunday evening and requested a meeting with Statoil’s finance team. This encounter was scheduled for Monday morning at 08.30. Information officer Håkon Lavik was assigned to fetch the visitors from the city’s best hotel – the Atlantic – at 08.00.
He met four vice presidents, very correctly dressed in pin-stripe suits and ties. They insisted on leaving at once to avoid being late. A taxi was ordered and the group arrived at about 08.15 at Statoil’s international department, which was then based at Flintgaten 2 in the Hillevåg district.
The only Norwegian present then who was due to attend the meeting was Jørn Larsen, a burly type from the Jæren farming district south of Stavanger wearing jeans and a pullover.
Tor Espedal, the chief financial officer, arrived soon afterwards. He always started his working day with a swim and still had wet hair, as well as being sweaty and open-collared (his tie was in his pocket) after cycling to the office.
Then came a very correctly dressed Eivind Brekkelund, an economist, followed by Jan Erik Langangen – a later Statoil chair – in jogging gear. His suit was in the changing room.
Jan Erik Langangen running the Holmenkoll relay. Photo: Equinor
Svein Andersen, head of the company’s internal audit function, turned up next. He was also on a bike, wearing trainers and an anorak.
Finally came Thor Inge Willumsen, later Statoil’s CFO, in a pullover and without a tie, and munching on a carrot which marked the end of his breakfast.
Only a few minutes passed before everyone was ready for the meeting, and Statoil was loaned billions of kroner. But the Japanese visitors were undoubtedly taken a little aback at Norwegian culture of informality.
Despite their relaxed style, the Statoil team was no gang of small fry. All those mentioned later become senior vice presidents in Statoil, while Brekkelund went to Mobil and then to Shell.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ibid.
Anti-aircraft guns on Statfjord
The Statoil management received an important visit from the Supreme Soviet one September day in 1976. After the conventional introductions by chair Finn Lied and CEO Johnsen, the latter gave a briefing on the company’s operations. That included a review of the current construction of the Statfjord A platform, with particular emphasis on building concrete gravity base structures. This was long before the computer age, and engineers commissioned detailed models of such installations to help their design work.
The model of Statfjord A stood in the corridor outside the meeting room in Lagårdsveien 78, which functioned as Statoil’s head office at the time. During the presentation, with associated slides, a discussion began with and between the visitors about whether the Soviet Union had any such structures. The delegation claimed it had, and even some that were larger.
Representatives from the Soviet Union, on a visit to Statoil, gathered around a model of Statfjord Phase I. Photo: Equinor
After the meeting, the group assembled around the model. This was very detailed, and visitors noticed that water monitors were installed around and about the topsides in case of fire. But the Soviet delegates through they were anti-aircraft guns – because that was something they really knew about. From their perspective, this felt to be was essential. Fire-fighting was an unnecessary precaution. The visitors were otherwise very grateful for Statoil’s openness, which they much appreciated. It only emerged later how distinguished this visit had been.
When the next session of the Supreme Soviet opened a few weeks later, and the event was shown on the TV news, three of the delegates were seen seated in the first row on the podium. They were immediately behind Communist Party head Leonid Brezhnev, who gave the opening speech. The visitors had been really top politicians with great influence in the Soviet Union.[REMOVE]Fotnote: Ibid.